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enrollment of last year. The first year of summer sessions at the
School of Law was quite successful. It is planned to continue
summer work, and a six weeks' session will be offered during the
summer of 1938.
NOTES
ST. LOUIS PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION
A condemnation procedure under the Charter of the City of
St. Louis, is instituted by ordinance of the Board of Aldermen
upon recommendation of the Board of Public Service of the city.2
The City Counselor is required to file the condemnation suit
within six months after the ordinance becomes effective.3 It
would seem that the time limit for filing suits would be ample,
yet, many proceedings have failed upon the enactment of the first
ordinance by reason of the limited time in which to secure
certificates of title and other data necessary for the filing of
condemnation suits. However, the object of the time limit is
to speed up the proceedings.
Without going into details as to who should be made parties
defendant, suffice it to say that all parties interested in parcels
of property sought to be taken or damaged are joined as de-
fendants in each cause or proceeding. Upon the filing of the
petition by the City Counselor, summons is issued and defendants
are given ten-days' notice4 of the hearing on the petition. How-
ever, there is seldom a hearing on the petition unless some de-
fendant desires to raise a jurisdictional or constitutional ques-
tion. Such questions should be raised then, but in actual prac-
tice they are often raised upon exceptions taken to the commis-
sioners' reports. Also at the hearing on the petition the question
as to whether or not the project proposed by the condemnation
is for a public use should be raised and determined by the court
as a matter of law at that time before the cause proceeds further.
When service of process upon all the defendants on the eminent
domain side of the cause is completed, the case is ready for
assignment to a division of the Circuit Court for reference to
the Condemnation Commission to assess damages and benefits.
1. Charter of 1914 as amended April 4, 1933.
2. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 1. The charter may be found in Revised Code
of St. Louis (1926) at page 1087. It is hereafter referred to as "Charter."
3. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 1. Ordinances are effective thirty days after
approval by the mayor. Charter, art. IV, sec. 19.
4. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 2.
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Under the St. Louis procedure, the assessment of damages and
benefits is made by three commissioners and not by a common-
law jury of twelve. The Charter does provide that "any party
entitled to and desiring trial by jury" shall ask for it prior to
the reference to commissioners.5
At common law a party was not entitled to trial by jury in
condemnation proceedings.6 But the Constitution of Missouri
provides that the right of trial by a jury shall be held inviolate
in eminent domain proceedings when "an incorporated company
shall be interested for or against the exercise of said right.' 7
The courts of this state have held that a municipal corporation
is not "an incorporated company" within the meaning of the
constitutional provision., Therefore, an individual owner and
defendant in a condemnation proceeding in which the City of
St. Louis is plaintiff is not entitled to trial by a jury. A private
corporation, being "an incorporated company," would be entitled
to a common-law jury if it made demand therefor prior to the
time when the case was referred to the commissioners for the
assessment of damages and benefits. The fact that some of the
defendants in the cause are incorporated companies does not give
defendants who are individuals the right to demand a common-
law jury.9 Incidentally, there is no requirement in the Constitu-
tion of Missouri or in the Charter of the City of St. Louis that
special benefits shall be assessed by a jury.10
If and when a jury trial is allowed to an incorporated com-
pany, the verdict is certified by the Circuit Court to the con-
demnation commissioners who are to include that verdict as a
part of the damages awarded in their report.1
The commissioners are authorized to fix the "benefit or taxing
district," and to publish the same for a period of ten days before
beginning their assessment of damages and benefits. 2 The pur-
pose of the published notice is to give the time and place where
the commissioners will meet and hear evidence on benefits and
to prescribe the boundaries of the taxing district within which
5. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 3.
6. Kansas City v. Smith (1911) 238 Mo. 323, 331; St. Joseph v. Geiwitz
(1899) 148 Mo. 210, 216; City of St. Louis v. Smith (1930) 325 Mo. 471,
30 S. W. (2d) 729.
7. Const. of Mo., art. XII, sec. 4.
8. Kansas City v. Smart (1895) 128 Mo. 272; Kansas City v. Vineyard
(1895) 128 Mo. 75, 30 S. W. 326; St. Louis v. Roe (1904) 184 Mo. 324.
9. Kansas City v. Vineyard (1895) 128 Mo. '75, 30 S. W. 326, cited in
United States v. Hess (1934) 70 F. (2d) 142, 145.
10. City of St. Louis v. Buss (1900) 159 Mo. 9, 12, 59 S. W. 969, 970.
11. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 5.
12. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 5.
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benefits are to be assessed. This notice, when published as re-
quired by the Charter, is service of process upon the land in
said district for the purpose of assessing benefits. Benefits can-
not be assessed without such publication. The commissioners,
however, are not required to assess all the property within the
published district.18
Incidental to the ascertainment of the damages the Charter
prescribes two duties for commissioners, namely, to view the
property and to hear evidence offered by the interested parties.14
The Charter requires that commissioners shall assess damages
and benefits as of the effective date of the ordinance. 0 This date,
known in condemnation circles as the date of valuation, has often
been the bone of contention either in hearings before commis-
sioners or in the trial of exceptions in the Circuit Court. The
Supreme Court of Missouri has never passed upon the legality
of the St. Louis date of valuation when the taking of property
was involved, but it has dealt with the question of the assess-
ment of benefits on the effective date of the ordinance in two
cases " growing out of a street widening. The court held in effect
that there was no constitutional provision governing the assess-
ment of benefits.
A date of valuation for the taking of private property that
would render complete justice under all circumstances would be
rather difficult to fix. Objections may be made to any date. The
ideal date of valuation would be the fictitious date as used by
Lewis who refers to the illustration of a pie-powder court where
with the ax in one hand you chop off the line of buildings and
pay the money with the other.'1 Such an ideal cannot be reached.
The ordinance must be passed, and the City Counselor must file
the suit within six months from the effective date of the ordi-
nance. After the suit is filed, time is required to secure personal
service upon the defendants within the City and State, and there-
after publication must be had upon "not found" and unknown
defendants. If a street widening is a project three to five miles
in length, there may be 200 to 300 parcels of land involved, and
there may be as many as 700 to 900 defendants. Very few of the
13. City of St. Louis v. Brown (1900) 155 Mo. 545, 559, 56 S. W. 298;
Wabash Ry. Co. v. City of St. Louis (1933) 64 F. (2d) 921, 930.
14. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 5.
15. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 5. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis be-
comes effective thirty days after it is approved by the mayor unless it is an
emergency measure. Art. IV, see. 19.
16. City of St. Louis v. Senter Com. Co. (Mo. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 133,
rehearing denied (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 21.
17. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain (1909) 1221, sec. 705.
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major street widening projects involve fewer parcels and fewer
defendants than the number above suggested, and it is very
seldom that a case of that size may be referred to commissioners
within two years after the effective date of the ordinance.
It is often urged that the date of valuation should be the date
of the filing of the commissioners' report. Such a date would be
in the future with reference to the time that the commissioners
would assess the damages and, therefore, such a date would be
wholly speculative.
Dates of valuation have been fixed by statute in California,
Utah and New Jersey and the appellate courts of those states
have held such statutes valid.28 It must be remembered that the
federal and state constitutions guarantee to the property owner
"just compensation" and that any statute attempting to fix a
date of valuation for the taking of private property must comply
with those constitutional requirements.
In paying compensation and damages, the measure of damages
is the market value of the property. Expressed in another way,
the damages are the difference in valuation before and after a
part of the property is taken from the whole parcel.1 9 The appli-
cation of the market-value rule is very simple where the whole
parcel is taken, but complications arise when only a part of the
parcel is taken. The rule for "before and after taken" then
applies.
After the commissioners ascertain the damages of a project,
it then becomes their duty to take up the matter of the assess-
ment of benefits. The Charter provides that for the payment of
all such damages the commissioners shall assess benefits to help
pay the cost of the project. More specifically, the commissioners
"shall assess against the lots or parcels of property * * * espe-
cially benefited by the proposed improvement * * * the amount
that each such lot or parcel of property * * * shall be especially
benefited."20
Special benefits, as assessed pursuant to the provisions of the
City Charter, have been defined by the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, as follows: "Lands in such a
benefit district whose market value has been increased by reason
18. City of Los Angeles v. Pomroy (1899) 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585;
Santa Anna v. Bruner (1909) 132 Cal. 234, 64 Pac. 287; City of Los Angeles
v. Gager (1909) 10 Cal. App. 378, 102 Pac. 17; See also Sanitary District
v. Chapin (1907) 226 Ill. 449, 503, 80 N. E. 1017.
19. City Water Co. v. Hunter (1928) 319 Mo. 1240, 1245, 6 S. W. (2d)
565, 566; Railroad Co. v. Carton Real Estate Co. (1907) 204 Mo. 565, 575,
103 S. W. 519.
20. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 4.
19371 NOTES
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of improvement are especially benefited."121 Whether or not a
tract of land is benefited by reason of a street opening or widen-
ing, and, if so, to what extent, are questions of fact to be deter-
mined by the commissioners. In the ascertainment of damages,
the matter before the commissioners is the determination of the
values. In the assessment of benefits the matter before the com-
missioners is the determination of the increment of value.
There are certain limitations on assessments. If a parcel of
land is not benefited, of course, it is not to be assessed. The
Charter limitation is that the gross assessment of benefits cannot
exceed the gross amount of damages. 22 However, the gross as-
sessment of benefits, generally, is less than the gross amount of
damages, and the balance of the cost of the project is, of course,
assessed against the City of St. Louis. It is very rare that
damages and benefits are equal except in an alley opening where
the Charter requires that the assessment of benefits against the
lots or parcels in the block shall equal all the damages assessed. 2
Another limitation on the assessment of benefits is the extent
of the increase in the market value of the property.24 Any assess-
ment higher than the increase in market value would be arbi-
trary and without any basis.
The question is often asked, What is the real basis for the
assessment of benefits? Some say that it is all guesswork; that
it is wholly speculative. Others say that there is no such thing
as benefits. The writer does not assume to give the answer or to
solve the problem. By way of suggestion, reference is made to a
subdivision in which streets and alleys are dedicated. These
streets and alleys make the lots and parcels accessible. The sub-
divider has to provide streets and alleys in order to sell the lots,
but he adds the cost price of the dedicated areas to the selling
price of the lots. Hence the abutting lot owners actually, al-
though unknowingly, pay for the streets and alleys.
A street widening could be perfected by dedication by the
numerous abutting property owners, but this is rarely done. The
city could not demand such a dedication from the property own-
ers, for under the Constitution of Missouri they must be com-
pensated. Therefore, condemnation proceedings are instituted
21. Wabash Railroad Co. v. City of St. Louis (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 64 F.
(2d) 921, 928.
22. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 4.
23. Ibid.
24. Schwab v. City of St. Louis (1925) 310 Mo. 116, 130, 274 S. W.
1058; Ranney v. Cape Girardeau (1914) 255 Mo. 514, 164 S. W. 582; City
of St. Louis v. Ranken (1888) 96 Mo. 497, 500, 504, 9 S. W. 910.
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to widen the streets and special benefits are assessed on property
which the commissioners find is benefited. The difference is that
these assessments cannot be hidden. While the example of a
subdivision may not be an exact comparison, it serves well to
illustrate the principle.
When the commissioners' report is filed, the city or the owners
have twenty days within which to file exceptions and objections
to the report.
Within twenty days from the fling of the commissioners'
report, exceptions, in writing, thereto may be filed by any
party interested, and upon such exceptions the court shall
review the report and may order, on cause shown, a new
assessment by other commissioners, or make such other
orders thereon as justice may require. The court shall hear
and dispose of such exceptions with all reasonable speed and
may itself assess benefits anew.2 5
If no exceptions are filed the case is ready for final judgment
which approves the commissioners' report. Any item of the re-
port to which no exceptions are filed is final insofar as the award
is concerned.
Exceptions are tried by the court without a jury. The trial
court may reassess benefits, but it cannot assess damages.2 6
Upon hearing testimony on damages, the court may overrule the
exceptions, or it may sustain the exceptions and refer the matter
to commissioners. Upon the trial of exceptions, under the St.
Louis procedure, it is the duty of the court to review the com-
missioners' report. In City of St. Louis v. Abeln,27 the court held
that the commissioners, who made findings, were competent to
testify. The court pointed out that there was no statute to dis-
qualify the commissioners, that no principle of law was violated
in permitting them to testify, and that often the courts, in con-
sidering exceptions, would be in the dark as to the theory which
commissioners followed in arriving at the awards if they were
not permitted to testify. The court in the Abeln case said
In a review of the commissioners' report on exceptions there-
to, the report itself is to be considered, and it must stand
until it is shown to be wrong either in a point of law or in a
matter of fact.
In City of St. Louis v. Rossi,2 8 it was held that the commis-
sioners had followed erroneous principles as to the measure of
25. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 7.
26. Const. of Mo., art. II, sec. 20.
27. (1902) 170 Mo. 318, 70 S. W. 708.
28. (1933) 333 Mo. 1092, 64 S. W. (2d) 600, 606.
19371 NOTE9
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damages, :and that the report was wrong and could not stand.
Unquestionably, the best way to show how the commissioners
arrived at their awards either in point of fact or on principles
of law would be to permit them to testify. On this point, how-
ever, the Abeln case was reversed in City of St. Louis v. Schopp.20
It would seem that this decision is unsound in principle. In the
trial of exceptions, under the St. Louis procedure where there
is no jury, there would appear to be no reason on principle why
a commissioner should not testify.
The Supreme Court of Missouri also departed from the ruling
in the Abeln case in City of St. Louis v. Schopp0 when it held
that the effect of filing exceptions to commissioners' report was
"to vacate the award and to afford the exceptors a trial de novo."
In that ruling the Supreme Court followed the same theory as is
followed under the Corporation Statute where exceptions are
tried before a jury, hereinafter briefly discussed. The ruling in
the Schopp case, however, has not been followed in recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. Judge Ragland in City of St. Louis
v. Turner3l approved the Abeln case on this point. The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals in Wabash Railway Company v.
City of St. Louis, 2 in an opinion by Judge Otis, also casts a doubt
upon the soundness of the rulings in the Schopp case.
On a mere question of value, depending upon conflicting evi-
dence, the Circuit Court will interfere with the award of the
commissioners only in cases in which the damages are flagrantly
excessive or inadequate.3 3 Where there is substantial competent
evidence the Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial
court's ruling upon exceptions.3 4
The effect of filing exceptions under the Corporation Statute5
is quite different from filing exceptions under Section 7 of the
City Charter. Under the state procedure the filing of exceptions
29. (1930) 325 Mo. 480, 30 S. W. (2d) 733.
30. See 30 S. W. (2d) at 735.
31. (1932) 331 Mo. 834, 55 S. W. (2d) 942, 943.
32. (1933) 64 F. (2d) 921, 924. In City of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank(Mo. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 3, the Supreme Court of Missouri again ap-
proved the Abeln case with reference to the standing of the commsisioners'
report in the trial court.
33. City of St. Louis v. Calhoun (1909) 222 Mo. 44, 55, 120 S. W. 1152,
1154; City of St. Louis v. Rossi (Mo. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 946, 947.
34. City of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank (Mo. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 3;
City of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank (Mo. 1936) 100 S. W. (2d) 927; City
of St. Louis v. Senter Commission Co. (1935) 336 Mo. 1209, 84 S. W. (2d)
133, 142; City of St. Louis v. Rossi (1933) 332 Mo. 498, 58 S. IV. (2d)
965; City of St. Louis v. Turner (1932) 331 Mo. 834, 55 S. W. (2d) 942.
35. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 1340-49.
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automatically sets aside the commissioners' report.3 6 The court
does not have before it the commissioners' report, as it does in
the St. Louis procedure, and the report of commissioners cannot
be presented in evidence for the reason that "the jury have no
more right to know what the report or assessment of damages
was than any jury in any case has to know what the verdict of a
previous jury was in the same case. '37
Thus it is seen that the St. Louis procedure and the State
procedure in condemnation proceedings are entirely different.
Both procedures have been clearly defined by the Supreme Court
of Missouri, and it is unthinkable that they should be confused.
The conflict between St. Louis procedure and State procedure
in condemnation proceedings, is explained in Kansas City v.
Field28 in which the Supreme Court of Missouri held that con-
demnation proceedings were matters of mere municipal regula-
tions and that such proceedings supersede state law when the
two conflict. The Field case, and numerous other cases of the
same import, are collected and cited in State ex rel. Kansas City
'i. L~ucas. 39
CHARTER AMENDMENT NUMBER TEN
On April 4, 1933, Condemnation Article XXI, of the City
Charter was amended. The principal changes made by that
amendment were in the selection of commissioners, their legal
qualifications, their terms of office, the manner of referring of
cases to commissioners, and the elimination, as far as possible,
of the fee system for the payment of commissioners. Formerly,
three commissioners were appointed by the Circuit Court to
assess damages and benefits in each project. They were paid at
the rate of $5.00 per day for a day of at least two hours. By the
new amendment three commissioners are appointed by the Cir-
cuit Court for specific terms at fixed salaries to deal with all
condemnation cases to which the City of St. Louis is a party.
With respect to the qualifications of commissioners the new
amendment provides
One such commissioner and one alternate shall be a person
familiar, by practice and experience, with the value of real
estate, one shall be familiar with the cost and practice of
building construction, and one shall have had general busi-
ness experience in the city.40
36. Railroad Co. v. Pfau (1908) 212 Mo. 398, 409, 111 S. W. 10; Rail-
road Co. v. Woodward (1906) 193 Mo. 656, 661, 91 S. W. 917.
37. Railroad Co. v. Roberts (1905) 187 Mo. 309, 321, 86 S. W. 91.
38. (1889) 99 Mo. 352, 12 S. W. 802.
39. (1927) 317 Mo. 255, 263, 296 S. W. 781, 784.
40. Charter, art. XXI, sec. 3.
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In the event of the death, disability, illness or disqualification
of any commissioner, an alternate is designated to take his place.
However, it is also the custom of the court to refer matters to
the alternate conmissioners where the court feels that the com-
missioners have erred in making their awards.
The Supreme Court of Missouri held in State ex rel. City of
St. Louis v. Hall4l that Amendment Number Ten was legally
adopted. It would appear that the Charter amendment, which
requires commissioners to be appointed by the Circuit Court to
assess damages and benefits in all cases instead of by commis-
sioners appointed for each project, is constitutional for the state
Constitution of Missouri provides that compensation shall be
determined by commissioners "in such manner as may be pre-
scribed by law."42 There is no provision in the constitution which
requires that there should be commissioners for each project.
It leaves to the law-making body the authority to determine the
manner of the appointment and the tenure of such commission-
ers. Amendment Number Ten provides that the Circuit Court,
in General Term, shall appoint three commissioners and three
alternates. This is the manner "prescribed by law," and appears
to be in compliance with the constitutional provision.
In the past, one of the chief objections to the St. Louis pro-
cedure came from the land owners in the taxing district. The
notice published in the Daily Record did not give them actual
notice. Under the new amendment, in addition to the Daily
Record, the notice of the benefit or taxing district must also ap-
pear in one of the daily newspapers of the city and six copies
of the notice are posted by the city marshal within the taxing
district. These additional notice requirements seem to have effec-
tuated a greater degree of actual notice to the property owners
affected.
The hearings before commissioners, under the St. Louis pro-
cedure, have always been informal for the reason that many
property owners appear without counsel or without appraisers.
There are many property owners who do not appear at all, even
though they may have received "courtesy notices" by mail. In
all such instances, where the property owners fail to furnish the
necessary information, the commissioners have always given
special consideration to matters of valuation.
J. P. STEINER..
41. (Mo. 1934) 75 S. W. (2d) 578.
42. Const. of Mo., art. II, sec. 21.
f Member, Condemnation Commission of City of St. Louis, 1934-37.
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